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The defense and defensibility of our systems and
networks is often conflated with the culpability of
human decision-makers. This is reflected in the oftenquoted turn of phrase that “the human is the weakest
link”. Understanding the analogy is nearly automatic.
The weakest link in a chain will fail before the others.
Humans often make bad security choices which cause
failures in security. This faulty reasoning leads to the
conclusion that we should simply remove human
decisions from security and that will make our systems
more secure.
This philosophy is emblematic of modern cyber
defenses where corporations and government
organizations seek turnkey solutions which promise
improved security while requiring only minimal
manning and maintenance. More recently focus has
shifted from mere automation to the application of
machine learning and other artificial intelligence
techniques. However, the human is simply not a
removable component. And the user is not the only
human implicated in a cyberattack.
The user may fall prey to deception in the form of a
phishing email, the email client being used hiding
security relevant information and placing the threat
alongside emails from known sources, biasing the user
to trust its content simply through its adjacency to
trusted sources. Automated detection tools quickly
identify the malicious nature of files transiting the
network, but instilled with the biases of the security
engineer, these tools are not capable of asking the user
how the malicious file was obtained. The cyber
defender triages events as they are received and
preemptively locks the infected computer against
further use, unaware that this action will directly
inform the attacker of the detectability of the malicious
file. The attacker continues with impunity by sending
a new malicious file to an as yet unaffected user,
achieving simultaneously a defender-imposed denial of
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service and eventual success in implanting
undetectable malware within the network. Every
component of this scenario is a weak link.
Over the last decade, our respective communities have
begun to recognize the need to study the human
decision makers in cyber environments and to do so
from all facets and perspectives as they relate to the
security and defensibility of our systems. Extending
this endeavor, our communities have also realized the
value in understanding, informing, protecting, and
exploiting human psychological biases.
By leveraging knowledge of a user’s deficiencies,
automated systems might better inform them of threats.
By exploiting an attacker’s inherent biases, we might
create systems which are able to enjoy the advantage of
Stackelberg’s first mover’s advantage, delaying an
attacker’s progress and deterring further action through
direct and intentional deception. By exposing the
biases and preferences of an attacker, we might enable
defenders to understand the motivation for an attack
and to thus take actions which prevent the goals of the
attacker rather than solely mitigating the immediate
perceived threat. By demonstrating the relationship
between user, system, and network, we may embolden
security engineers to incorporate human perception and
cognition rather than eschewing them – refocusing the
purpose of security to achieving the user’s mission
rather than simply preventing the immediate attack or
falling headlong into misdirection.
Lastly, and most importantly, this could enable
identification of an insider who is ever present.
Authorized users of systems and networks, or
masqueraders of these users, may act as attackers.
These insiders can leak sensitive information
deliberately or accidentally. Detecting and thwarting
these attacks is more difficult than dealing with
external attackers because the users are often
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authorized to access the information, or the systems
and networks the data is on. As a defensive technique,
deception in this context must take into account the
psychology of the attacker and the organizational,
political, and societal environments in which the attack
occurs.

minitrack features five papers. The first group of
papers focus on cyber psychology: (1) providing
analysis to identify gaps in cyber incident response
teams, and (2) providing guidelines towards building
automated cybersecurity technologies based on
established human factors theory.

Looking back on decades of work by cognitive
psychologists, and highlighted by current events, it is
easily realized that defender, attacker, and even
bystander are often the victims of cognitive bias and
the incredulous sycophants of fallacious reasoning. It
is unarguable that both attackers and defenders are
susceptible to decision-making bias. Bias, in some
situations, can cause as much harm as direct and
conscious action. Thus, it should be our goal to protect
the defender from the insider threat of their own
inherent cognitive biases, while adversely affecting the
attacker using the same.

1) Identifying Expertise Gaps in Cyber Incident
Response: Cyber Defender Needs vs.
Technological Development (by Megan Nyre-Yu)

The principal open questions for our community are
whether and how we are able to incorporate knowledge
of this bias into the manner in which we defend our
systems and users. How should these systems
incorporate knowledge of human behavior and
psychology for defensive purposes? What are useful
metrics and measures to quantify the effectiveness of
these techniques and systems? To what extent do the
capabilities of defensive deception and the
characteristic features of cyber psychology
fundamentally change how we secure our systems,
protect our networks, and minimize harm to people?
Cyber deception is a collection of defensive techniques
that considers the human component of cyberattacks.
Deception holds promise as a successful tactic for
making an attacker’s job harder by moving beyond
mere perimeter defenses. It can disrupt or delay
progress of a persistent attacker by wasting their time,
resources, and effort. Moreover, deception can be used
strategically by a defender to develop specific incorrect
beliefs in the attacker, the effects of which can persist
over time. Understanding the cognition and behavior of
both the cyber defender and cyber attacker is a critical
component. Cyber psychology research advances the
science of human behavior and decision making in
cyberspace to understand, anticipate, and influence
attacker behavior. It also seeks to ensure scientific
rigor and quantify the effectiveness of our defensive
methods.
These research efforts require an interdisciplinary
approach and the mini-track is pleased to present
papers across multiple disciplines. This year the

2) Human Factors in Automating Cyber Operations
(by Robert Gutzwiller and Dirk Van Bruggen)
The next set of papers features in this minitrack is
focused on building cyber deception technologies: (3)
using a game-theoretic framework to automatically
select which emulated software stack will provide the
highest defender payoff, and (4) using an autonomic
reasoning approach for a system to perform automated
countermeasures using adaptive deception techniques.
3) Software Deception Steering through Version
Emulation (by Frederico Araujo, Sailik Sengupta,
Jiyong Jang, Adam Doupé, Kevin Hamlen,
Subbarao Kambhampati)
4) Towards Self-Adaptive Cyber Deception for
Defense (by Jason Landsborough, Braulio
Coronado, Luke Carpenter, Sunny Fugate,
Kimberly Ferguson-Walter, Dirk Van Bruggen)
And finally, we introduce the paper nominated from
this minitrack for Best Paper this year, which is a
lovely pairing of both cyber deception and cyber
psychology: (5) details the results from a design
thinking workshop conducted using experts from
different fields including critical analysis of design
provocations for cyber deception and a journey map
providing considerations for operationalization of
cyber deception technologies.
5) Design Thinking for Cyber Deception (by Debi
Ashenden, Rob Black, Iain Reid, Simon
Henderson)
We believe that our community is at the cusp of rapid
advances in defensible human-machine systems. The
multidisciplinary nature of the work represented in the
minitrack this year is representative of the novel
intersection of psychology, human-machine
interaction, artificial intelligence, and cyber defense.
We are eager to facilitate discussions based on these
new and exciting contributions to the community.
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